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JURISDICTION 
This appeal is taken pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 78-2(a)-
3(2)(c) as amended 1988, and Rules 3 and 4 of the Rules of the Utah Court 
of Appeals. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is taken from Summary Judgment entered against the 
Appellant in the Third Circuit Court, State of Utah, Salt Lake County, Salt 
Lake Department, and denial of Appellant's Motion to Alter, Amend or 
Vacate, made pursuant to Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
STATEMENT O F ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Was the granting of Plaintiffs motion for Summary Judgment 
improper and prejudicial error in that there existed and were placed before 
the court genuine issues of material fact? 
Did the refusal of the Circuit Court to vacate the Summary Judgment 
by granting Appellant's Rule 59 Motion supported by uncontradicted 
affidavits constitute abuse of discretion and error? 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
This case is governed by select provisions of the Uniform 
Commercial Code, U.C.A §70A, et seq., contained in Addendum "A" of 
this brief and Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case is governed by the special rules of the Uniform 
Commercial Code respecting the sale of goods. Respondent filed a 
complaint in the Third Circuit Court alleging that a Hermes 51 Typewriter 
purchased following a 90 day trial period on July 29, 1987, was defective. 
Respondent's complaint stated two counts as grounds for relief. Both 
counts sought relief under §70A-2-608. Respondent subsequently filed a 
Motion for Summary Judgment, which was heard by the court on October 
12, 1988, and granted at that time. Appellant then filed a Motion to Alter, 
Amend or Vacate, which was heard on December 14, 1988 and denied at 
that time. Appellants Motion to Alter, Amend or Vacate tolled the 
applicable period of time for appeal of the Summary Judgment granted on 
October 12, 1988, pursuant to the holding in Hume v. Small Claims Court. 
590 P.2d 309 (Utah 1979). Appellant timely filed the present appeal 
following the denial of its Motion to Alter, Amend or Vacate. 
STATEMENT OF F A C T S 
K & K Insurance (Plaintiff) purchased a Hermes 51 typewriter from 
Salt Lake Typewriter (Defendant) which was delivered on or about March 
30, 1987. (Complaint para. 7) Plaintiff paid for the typewriter on or about 
July 29, 1987, after the trial period of ninety (90) days had lapsed. 
Plaintiff has retained the possession and use of the Hermes 51 typewriter 
since delivery to date. 
At the hearing for Summary Judgment, Defendant's counsel, then 
Mr. Hunt, identified the issues of material fact before the court regarding 
rejection within a reasonable time and seasonable notification of the 
rejection: 
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Mr. Hunt: If the Court please, the Commercial 
Code uses the term rightfully rejected or 
rightfully rescinded. This machine was in use 
something over half a year before there even was 
a letter. 
TSJ at 7. 
Plaintiff claimed it experienced problems with the subject 
typewriter. (Complaint para. 11, T. 5-6 on Motion for Summary 
Judgment, hereinafter "TSJ") After inspection, it was determined that the 
complaints and problems were connected to the power supply at Plaintiffs 
office then located at 654 South 900 East, Salt Lake City, Utah. Defendant 
had no control over the power source or its stability. A surge protector 
was recommended to solve the problem. (See statement of Donald 
Thompson, attached as addendum "B") Plaintiff determined that the surge 
protector was too expensive and sent it back to Salt Lake Typewriter 
without using or paying for it. 
Plaintiff, (K & K Insurance) moved its office from its old location to 
its present location in October, 1987. Defendant was not made aware that 
Plaintiff claimed the problems with the typewriter continued until 
receiving a letter dated February 29, 1988, some five (5) months after 
Plaintiff moved its offices. Plaintiff claimed that it sent a letter to 
Defendant dated February 5, 1988 which was in fact sent by Plaintiff to 
itself and signed by their own employee, Mary Strang. Defendant disputes 
and denies having ever received this letter. 
From approximately February 29, 1988 to March 23, 1988, 
Defendant was not given access to the equipment to determine if a problem 
existed, and if one did, the nature of the problem. Calls were made by Mr. 
Sanders, President of Salt Lake Typewriter, to Mr. Kauffman of K & K 
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Insurance in an attempt to arrange an appointment to have the equipment 
inspected, determine if there was a problem and if one existed have it 
corrected. Each time Mr. Sanders was told that he would have to talk to 
Mr. Kauffman directly, although Mr. Kauffman was not available. 
Shortly after the hearing of October 12, 1988 on Plaintiffs Motion 
for Summary Judgment, Defendant, by its President, Mr. Sanders, made a 
surprise visit to the business office of K & K Insurance Company to view 
the Hermes 51 typewriter. He was accompanied by L. Keith Day and 
Margaret Voyles, both employees of Defendant, Salt Lake Typewriter. 
This surprise visit revealed that the Hermes 51 typewriter, the subject of 
this action, was in operating condition and in use by Mary B. Strang, the 
employee of Plaintiff, K & K Insurance. Mary Strang related to Mr. 
Sanders that a representative of Associated Business Machines had found a 
loose wire and fixed it. This information was not disclosed by Plaintiff at 
the hearing of the Motion for Summary Judgment. (See TSF generally, and 
affidavits contained in Addendum "C") Mr. Sanders requested Mary 
Strang to produce a repair bill or invoice showing the repair of the 
machine, which she could not do. The only explanation was she thought 
there had been no charge for the repair of the loose wire. Mary Strang 
also stated to Mr. Sanders that the Hermes 51 typewriter had operated 
properly from the time Plaintiff moved its office to 4001 South 700 East, 
Suite 520, Salt Lake City, Utah and the alleged repair of the loose wire. 
(Addendum T " ) 
Upon discovering this information, Defendant filed its Rule 59 
Motion and supported it by Affidavits. Defendant's Rule 59 Motion was 
heard by the Court on December 14, 1988. At this hearing, plaintiffs 
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counsel admitted and acknowledged that the Hermes 51 typewriter was still 
in possession of plaintiff and in full use. (T. 7, Transcript of Defendant's 
Motion to Alter, Amend or Vacate, hereinafter "TDM") Defendant's Rule 
59 Motion, after it was taken under advisement by the lower Court, Judge 
Eleanor Van Sciver, was denied, without a Memorandum or explanation. 
The conduct of the court in this matter may prove revealing. On 
commencing the hearing regarding Defendant's Motion to Alter, Amend or 
Vacate, the court stated in open court, with representatives of Defendant 
corporation present: 
The Court: Now, I suppose I'll take this case that 
keeps popping up more often that any others first. 
K&K Insurance Agency vs. Salt Lake Typewriter. 
This is your motion Mr. Fankhauser? 
Mr. Fankhauser: Yes, it is, your Honor. 
The Court: I see Mr. Hunt got tired of this case 
and withdrew. 
TDM at 2. This raises an issue of whether or not the court properly used 
the remedy of Summary Judgment to dispose of cases which present no 
issues of genuine material fact and can be disposed of as a matter of law, or 
whether or not summary judgment was used to dispose of what the court 
improperly felt was a nuisance. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Summary Judgment acts as a harsh remedy which should only be 
employed in cases where there clearly is no genuine issue of material fact 
which should go to trial by the trier of fact. Because of its harsh result, it 
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should be employed cautiously by the court and all doubts should be 
resolved in favor of the party moved against, in this case the appellant. 
This case involved sections of the Uniform Commercial code which refer 
to rejection within a "reasonable time" which are "seasonably" tendered. 
These terms raise issues of fact regarding the timing and manner of 
rejection of goods. Whether or not a rejection is timely and seasonably 
noticed depends entirely upon the circumstances and facts surrounding the 
transaction, the nature of the goods and the customs of the trade or 
industry. This case does not involve the lapse of a statute of limitations or 
the time for filing an answer or some other statutory provision which states 
a fixed period of time. We are dealing here with notions of 
"reasonableness" and "Seasonableness". These are genuine issues of 
material fact which cannot be disposed of properly by summary judgment. 
Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of factual issues which are more material 
and which are in dispute. 
Following the entry of summary judgment, Appellant's 
representatives paid a surprise visit to the offices of Respondent. The visit 
had to be a surprise since Respondent had repeatedly denied Appellant 
access to its facilities. New facts were brought to the attention of Appellant 
which were known by Respondent at the time judgment had been entered. 
These facts were of such a nature that Appellant filed a motion pursuant to 
Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in order to correct what appeared 
to be a serious misrepresentation practiced upon the court by Respondent. 
Appellant learned that, not only had there never been a serious problem 
with the machine in question, but that it had and was completely functional 
and in active use by Respondent. This fact was not discoverable by 
Appellant prior to or during trial, since Respondent had denied Appellant 
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access to its facilities repeatedly and Respondent had always maintained, 
since the filing of its Complaint that the machine was not functional. 
Furthermore, there had never been a "trial" as such, but only a hearing for 
Summary Judgment, and Appellant could not therefore discover anything 
by due diligence prior to "trial". The serious nature of these allegations, 
supported as they were by new uncontested affidavits required the court to 
reexamine the order and summary judgment entered earlier. Failure to 
due so constituted an abuse of discretion and prejudicial error. The failure 
of the court to reexamine these issues by proceeding to trial further 
substantiates the apparent prejudice of the court toward the Appellant, as 
evidenced by the court's remarks at the commencement of the hearing of 
Defendant's Rule 59 Motion. 
This court should reverse and remand for new trial on all issues, and 
grant Appellant its costs together with any and all other remedies 
determined to be fit and proper. 
POINT I 
THE GRANTING OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS IMPROPER SINCE THE 
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE PROVISION RAISE GENUINE ISSUES OF 
MATERIAL FACT REGARDING THE TIMING OF RESPONDENT'S REJECTION 
AND NOTIFICATION OF REJECTION. 
The standards under which a motion for Summary Judgment should 
be granted are clearly set forth in Utah law. There must be no genuine 
issue of material fact which requires trial by the trier of fact. If even a 
doubt exists as to whether or not there is a material issue of fact, then the 
case must go to trial. (See Bowen v. City of Riverton, 656 P.2d 434 (Utah 
1982); Lucky Seven Rodeo Corporation v. Clark. 755 P.2d 750 (Utah App. 
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1988):Western Pacific Transport v. Beehive State Agricultural Co-op. 597 
P.2d 854 (Utah 1979); Foster v. Steed. 432 P.2d 60 (Utah 1967); 
Controlled Receivables Inc. v. Harman, 413 P.2d 807 (Utah 1966); 
Durham v. Margetts. 571 P.2d 1332 (Utah 1977). Furthermore, this 
Court, pursuant to the applicable standard of review must liberally 
construe all factual allegations in a light most favorable to Appellant, and if 
there appears to be a single issue of material fact. (Oberhansly v. Sprouse. 
751 P.2d 1155 (Utah App. 1988). The disputed material fact in this case 
was raised by the very statute itself under which Respondent claimed relief. 
The Uniform Commercial Code, as we shall see, raises issues of fact by 
referring to a rightful rejection or revocation of acceptance that is made 
within a "reasonable time" based upon "seasonable" notice. By invoking 
this section of the Code, Respondent raised an immediate material issue of 
fact which could not be properly disposed of by means of Summary 
Judgment. 
The Complaint alleged a rightful revocation of Respondents 
acceptance of the Hermes 51 Typewriter under the provision of U.C.A. 
§70A-2-608, et seq. This section states in part that: 
(2) Revocation of acceptance must occur within a 
reasonable time after the buyer discovers or 
should have discovered the ground for it and 
before any substantial change in condition of the 
goods which is not caused by their own defects. It 
is not effective until the buyer notifies the seller 
of it. 
(3) A buyer who so revokes has the same rights 
and duties with regard to the goods involved as if 
he had rejected them. 
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U.C.A §70A--608 (2) et seq., emphasis added. The rightful rejection of 
goods referred to in subsection (3) above is addressed in §70A-2-602, et 
seq., which states in part: 
(1) Rejection of goods must be within a 
reasonable time after their delivery or tender. It 
is ineffective unless the buyer seasonably notifies 
the seller. 
U.C.A §70A--602 (1). The Uniform Commercial code further defines 
what is meant by a reasonable rejection and a seasonable notification of 
rejection under these provisions: 
(2) What is a reasonable time for taking any 
action depends on the nature, purpose and 
circumstances of such action. 
(3) An action is taken "seasonably" when it is 
taken at or within the time agreed or if no time is 
agreed at or within a reasonable time. 
U.C.A. 70A-1-204 et seq. If the revocation of an acceptance of goods is to 
be effective, and therefore result in the creation of rights of recovery of 
sums paid and damages to Plaintiff/Respondent, such revocation must fit 
the terms and rules of rightful rejection under the Uniform Commercial 
Code. The rejection, in order to be rightful, must be timely, that is made 
within a reasonable time and based upon seasonable notification of the 
rejection. The Utah Supreme Court addressed these issues in the case of 
Christopher v. Larson Ford Sales. 557 P.2d 1009 (Utah 1976). The court 
stated that: 
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What constitutes Ma reasonable time" for return 
and request for recission under [§70-2-608] is 
usually a question of fact to be determined from 
the circumstances of each case. 
Christopher at 1012. See also Lanners v. Whitney. 428 P.2d 398 (Or.). 
All relief requested by Respondent in its Complaint were premised upon a 
timely revocation and rejection of the typewriter under the Uniform 
Commercial Code. Whether or not the attempted rejection, which took 
place over half a year after the purchase of the machine following a 3 
month trial period was or was not reasonable depends on several factual 
determinations. 
First, the court must consider the customs of the industry; there was 
a 90-day warranty on the machine which may serve to set the bounds of 
reasonableness in this matter. Second, this was a transaction between 
merchants who had a history of dealings with each other. Third, the 
alleged notification came several months following the purchase of the 
machine. Fourth, when did the problem show up? Fifth, was the problem 
attributable to the location of the company, or to the burden placed upon 
the power supply at that location? Sixth, exactly when did the alleged 
tender of revocation occur? Seventh, what was the exact cause of the 
machine's dysfunction? All of these elements address the reasonableness of 
the timing of the revocation. The purposes of these provisions are to 
guarantee that a buyer cannot purchase a machine and then use it for its 
anticipated lifetime and thereafter "reject" it because it developed a 
functional problem. The granting of summary judgment under these 
conditions effectively undermines the rationale behind the Uniform 
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Commercial Code. There were in fact issues of material fact regarding the 
timeliness of the revocation and notification of the same. 
Respondent objected pursuant to Rule 56(e), Utah Rules of civil 
Procedure, to the form of the affidavit of Odell Sanders, which was filed in 
a timely manner. The Utah Supreme Court addressed the sufficiency of 
affidavits supporting or opposing motions for Summary Judgment in 
Lucky Seven at 752: 
One sworn statement under oath is all that is 
needed to dispute the averments on the other side 
of the controversy and create an issue of fact, 
precluding the entry of summary judgment. 
The affidavit of Odell Sanders provides disputed facts in excess of that 
required under either Rule 56 or Lucky Seven. The cover sheet to the 
affidavit states that Mr. Sanders is a fully trained expert in the installation, 
repair and maintenance of the Hermes electronic typewriter sold to the 
Respondent. He made statements under oath based upon personal 
knowledge of the events in question. Aside from the most obvious issue of 
material fact in this case (whether or not the amount of time that lapsed 
before an alleged notice of revocation of acceptance or rejection under the 
UCC), Mr. Sanders raises the following issues specifically. The equipment: 
1) was in service for over one year; 2) was used continually without proper 
surge protection; 3) was relocated by the customer to another location 
where the local power supply to the building was different; 4) was moved 
to another location by the customer without proper packing; 5) was 
installed by the customer at the new location and not by trained personnel. 
Any on?of these factors could be responsible for the alleged malfunctioning 
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of the machine, and not some alleged latent defect. The affidavit of Mr. 
Sanders was more than sufficient to raise serious issues of material fact. 
The court improperly granted summary judgment. The case should be 
remanded for proceedings in keeping with the letter and the spirit of the 
Uniform Commercial Code. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING DEFENDANTS MOTION TO 
ALTER, AMEND OR VACATE PURSUANT TO RULE 59 OF THE UTAH RULES 
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. 
Rule 59 provides the grounds upon which a motion for new trial 
should be granted: 
(a) Grounds Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, 
a new trial may be granted to all or any of the 
parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of 
the following causes: . . . 
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the 
party making the application, which could not, 
with reasonable diligence, have discovered and 
produced at trial. 
Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Although Appellant is not 
alleging a fraud on the part of Respondent, there was clear evidence of 
active and knowing misrepresentations made by Respondent at and before 
the hearing on Summary Judgment. The issue now before this court has 
been framed in several Utah cases. The granting of a motion for a new 
trial based upon newly discovered evidence must be founded upon material 
evidence which could not have been discovered by reasonable diligence 
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which is of such a nature that the outcome would have been different 
below. (Universal Inv. Co. v. Carpets. Inc., 400 P.2d 564 (Utah 1965); 
Gregerson v. Jensen, 617 P.2d 369 (Utah 1980); Dotv v. Town of Cedar 
Hills, 656 p.2d 993 (Utah 1982); Kettner v. Snow. 375 P.2d 28 (Utah 
962);) Appellant exercised that diligence required by a case of this type in 
discovering the issues of fact and law to be resolved at trial. This included 
the production of affidavits and other competent evidence. Since the 
problem was one of misrepresentation, Appellant argues that due diligence 
would likely resulted not in discovery of the complete operational 
condition of the machine, but would probably have resulted in further 
misrepresentations. The only reason that the functional condition of the 
machine was discovered was because of a "surprise" visit to Respondent's 
place of business. Appellant there discovered that not only was the 
machine functional then, but had been functional all along. Because 
Respondent's entire complaint was premised upon the existence of a non-
functional machine it is difficult to imagine how these facts could not create 
a different result than that achieved at the hearing for Summary Judgment. 
Therefore, Appellant was entitled to a new trial at which the functionality 
of the machine could be addressed.The court below wrongfully denied this 
motion in the face of new evidence which was uncontroverted, and which 
addressed the propriety and integrity of the most essential facts of the 
Complaint. This case should therefore be remanded with sufficient 
instructions to allow Appellant a fair trial of the issues and facts. 
C O N C L U S I O N 
The Uniform Commercial Code (basis for all relief prayed for by 
Respondent) requires revocations to be made in a reasonable time after 
13 
acceptance of goods in order to be effective. Whether or not Respondent's 
alleged rejection was made in a reasonable amount of time is a question of 
fact. That question of fact is material because it forms an essential element 
of Respondent's claim for relief. The granting of Summary Judgment 
under these conditions was improper and resulted in prejudicial error. 
Appellant was entitled to a new trial based upon newly discovered 
facts unknown at trial which would have likely resulted in a different 
outcome below. Respondent's misrepresentations go to the heart of the 
litigation. Respondent wrongfully recovered a judgment based upon those 
misrepresentations. In the interest of the integrity of the judicial system 
the interests of justice, this court should reverse and remand for further 
proceedings which reflect the intent and the letter of the law. 
Respectfully submitted this • ^ day of April, 1989. 
r
 Ephraim H. Fankhauser 
Attorney for Appellant 
MAILING C E R T I F I C A T E 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Brief of Appellant was mailed, 
postage prepaid, to John B. Anderson, Anderson & Holland, Attorneys for 
respondent, at 623 East First South, this ^ ^ day of April, 1989. 
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ADDENDUM A 
15 
70A-2-602 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 
Collateral References. 
Sales <&=> 164,177. 
77 CJS Sales §§ 168,184, 218. 
67 AmJur 2d 540 to 545, Sales §§ 386 to 389 
70A-2-602. Manner and effect of rightful rejection. 
(1) Rejection of goods must be within4 
delivery or tender. 
after their 
(2) Subject to the provisions of the two following sections on rejected 
/ goods (sections 70A-2-603 and 70A-2-6Q4), 
*W^*H&fc^ (a) 
(b) ^ _. ^T. „ mmrnm 
of goods in which he does notnave a security interest under 
the provisions of this chapter (subsection (3) of section 
70A-2-711), Jw^Hjjdfr^fl^^iiftpr TTTflrtirm fir hnht theci 
.jaejile^s* disp<«iticm for & tivcm 
I; but 
(c) the buyer lias no further obligations with regard to goods 
rightfully rejected. 
(3) The seller's rights with respect to goods wrongfully rejected are 
governed by the provisions of this chapter on seller's remedies in 
general utfpn^mMfii^ 
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 2-602. Seller's remedies in general, 70A-2-703. 
inspection of goods, 
buyer's rights, 
Cross-References. 
Buyer's right to 
70A-2-513. 
Improper delivery, 
70A-2-601. 
Merchant buyer's duties as to rightfully 
rejected goods, 70A-2-603. 
Notice or notification, 70A-1-201. 
Payment by buyer before inspection, 
70A-2-512. 
Reasonable time, 70A-1-204. 
Collateral References. 
Sales <3=> 177,178 (2). 
77 CJS Sales §§ 220, 224, 342. 
67 AmJur 2d 546 to 554, Sales §§ 391 to 397. 
Duty of purchaser of goods "on trial" or 
"on approval" regarding notice of rejection, 
78 ALR 533. 
Seller's right to retain down payment on 
buyer's unjustified refusal to accept goods, 11 
ALR 2d 701. 
70A-2-603. Merchant buyer's duties as to rightfully rejected goods. 
(1) Subject to any security interest in the buyer (subsection (3) of 
section 70A-2-711), when the seller has no agent or place of busi-
ness at the market of rejection a merchant buyer is under a duty 
after rejection of goods in his possession or control to follow any 
reasonable instructions received from the seller with respect to the 
goods and in the absence of such instructions to make reasonable 
efforts to sell them for the seller's account if they are perishable 
or threaten to decline in value speedily. Instructions are not 
reasonable if on demand indemnity for expenses is not forthcoming. 
(2) When the buyer sells goods under subsection (1), he is entitled to 
reimbursement from the seller or out of the proceeds for reason-
able expenses of caring for and selling them, and if the expenses 
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70A-2-608 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 
Deduction of damages from the price, 
70A-2-717. 
Notice and notification, 70A-1-201. 
Performance or acceptance under reserva-
tion of rights, 70A-1-207. 
Reasonable time, 70A-1-204. 
Revocation of acceptance in whole or in 
part, 70A-2-608. 
Waiver of buyer's objections by failure to 
particularize, 70A-2-605. 
Warranty against infringement, 70A-2-312. 
"Reasonable time." 
Where purchasers of a motor home, upon 
finding a number of defects in the vehicle, 
sought to rescind the contract the day after 
it was entered, but were persuaded by the 
seller to retain the vehicle and take it on a 
planned trip to California, during which time 
the already noted problems persisted and 
new ones became manifest so that the day 
after they returned home purchasers again 
attempted rescission, they acted within a 
"reasonable time" within the meaning of this 
section. Christopher v. Larson Ford Sales, 
Inc. (1976) 557 P 2d 1009. 
Collateral References. 
Indemnity <§=> 10, 12; Sales <3=> 179, 285, 
288 (2), 427. 
42 CJS Indemnity § 15; 77 CJS Sales §§ 218, 
225, 339, 346; 78 CJS Sales § 520. 
67 AmJur 2d 554 to 559, Sales §§ 399 to 401. 
Acceptance after agreed time of delivery as 
waiver of damages on account of seller's 
delay, 80 ALR 322. 
Buyer's acceptance of delayed installment 
of goods as waiver of similar default as to 
later installments, 32 ALR 2d 1128. 
Buyer's acceptance of part of goods as 
affecting right to damages for failure to com-
plete delivery, 169 ALR 595. 
Form and substance of notice which buyer 
of goods must give in order to recover dam-
ages for seller's breach of warranty, 53 ALR 
2d 270. 
Misrouting as affecting duty of the buyer 
to accept goods, 46 ALR 1120. 
Purchaser's use or attempted use of arti-
cles known to be defective as affecting dam-
ages recoverable for breach of warranty, 33 
ALR 2d 511. 
Right of seller as condition of delivery to 
insist on or resort to means not provided by 
contract to assure payment, 44 ALR 443. 
Seller's right to retain down payment on 
buyer's unjustified refusal to accept goods, 11 
ALR 2d 701. 
Seller's waiver of sales contract provision 
limiting time within which buyer may object 
to or return goods or article for defects or 
failure to comply with warranty or repre-
sentations, 24 ALR 2d 717. 
Sufficiency and timeliness of buyer's notice 
under UCC § 2-607 of seller's breach of war-
ranty, 93 ALR 3d 363. 
Use of article by buyer as waiver of right 
to rescind for fraud, breach of warranty, or 
failure of goods to comply with contract, 41 
ALR 2d 1173. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Counterclaim of buyer. 
Breach of promise or agreement on part of 
seller to furnish demonstrator does not 
defeat the right of seller to recover for goods 
sold, but saves to the purchaser the right to 
offset by way of counterclaim for any dam-
ages which may have been sustained by 
reason of the failure of the seller to perform 
that part of its agreement. Detroit Vapor 
Stove Co. v. Farmers' Cash Union (1923) 61 U 
567, 216 P 1075. 
Proffer return of goods by buyer. 
Where a horse was bought with the knowl-
edge of both parties that he was to be used 
for breeding purposes and the horse proved 
to be sterile but died before it could be 
returned, buyer was not barred from recov-
ery by his failure to proffer the return of the 
carcass nor could seller raise his own good 
faith as a defense where no fraud was 
claimed or shown as it was assumed by the 
court that both parties acted in good faith in 
respect to the defective horse. Ericksen v. 
Poulsen (1964) 15 U 2d 190, 389 P 2d 739. 
70A-2-608. Revocation of acceptance in whole or in part. 
(1) The buyer may revoke his acceptance of a lot or commercial unit 
whose nonconformity substantially impairs its value to him if he 
has accepted it 
(a) on the reasonable assumption that its nonconformity would 
be cured and it has not been seasonably cured; or 
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(b) without discovery of such nonconformity if his acceptance 
was reasonably induced either by the difficulty of discovery 
before acceptance or by the seller's assurances. 
(2) Revocation of acceptance must occur within a reasonable time after 
the buyer discovers or should have discovered the ground for it and 
before any substantial change in condition of the goods which is 
not caused by their own defects. It is not effective until the buyer 
notifies the seller of it. 
(3) A buyer who so revokes has the same rights and duties with regard 
to the goods involved as if he had rejected them. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 2-608. 
Cross-References. 
Effect of acceptance, 70A-2-607. 
Improper delivery, buyer's rights, 
70A-2-601. 
Proof of market price, 70A-2-723. 
Reasonable time, 70A-1-204. 
Rightful rejection, manner and effect, 
70A-2-602. 
Waiver of buyer's objections by failure to 
particularize, 70A-2-605. 
"Reasonable time/' 
What constitutes a "reasonable time" for 
revocation of acceptance under this section is 
usually a question of fact to be determined in 
light of the circumstances of the particular 
case, and the supreme court upon review will 
not disturb a finding on the issue unless 
there is no reasonable basis in the evidence 
to sustain it. Christopher v. Larson Ford 
Sales, Inc. (1976) 557 P 2d 1009. 
Where purchasers of a motor home, upon 
finding a number of defects in the vehicle, 
sought to rescind the contract the day after 
it was entered, but were persuaded by the 
seller to retain the vehicle and take it on a 
planned trip to California, during which time 
the already noted problems persisted and 
new ones became manifest so that the day 
after they returned home purchasers again 
attempted rescission, they acted within a 
"reasonable time" within the meaning of this 
section. Christopher v. Larson Ford Sales, 
Inc. (1976) 557 P 2d 1009. 
Collateral References. 
Sales <S=> 179, 427. 
77 CJS Sales § 225; 78 CJS Sales § 520. 
67 AmJur 2d 919 to 926, Sales §§ 710 to 716. 
Measure and elements of buyer's recovery 
upon revocation of acceptance of goods under 
UCC § 2-608 (1), 65 ALR 3d 388. 
Time for revocation of acceptance of goods 
under UCC § 2-608 (2), 65 ALR 3d 354. 
What constitutes "substantial impair-
ment" entitling buyer to revoke his accep-
tance of goods under UCC § 2-608, 98 ALR 3d 
1183. 
70A-2-609. Right to adequate assurance of performance. 
(1) A contract for sale imposes an obligation on each party that the 
other's expectation of receiving due performance will not be 
impaired. When reasonable grounds for insecurity arise with 
respect to the performance of either party the other may in writing 
demand adequate assurance of due performance and until he 
receives such assurance may if commercially reasonable suspend 
any performance for which he has not already received the agreed 
return. 
(2) Between merchants the reasonableness of grounds for insecurity 
and the adequacy of any assurance offered shall be determined 
according to commercial standards. 
(3) Acceptance of any improper delivery or payment does not prejudice 
the aggrieved party's right to demand adequate assurance of future 
performance. 
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"Good faith" defined, 70A-1-201 (19), Collateral References. 
70A-2-103(l)(b). 17 CJS Contracts §494. 
by ETO£?M8.0r ^ 1 5 A A m J u r 2 d 4 7 8 ' Commercial Code § 26. 
Merchant buyer's duties as to rejected 
goods, 70A-2-603. Effectiveness of original financing state-
Option to accelerate at will, 70A-1-208. ment under UCC article 9 after change in 
Substituted performance of contract for debtor's name, identity, or business struc-
sale, 70A-2-614. ture, 99 ALR 3d 1194. 
70A-1-204. Time — Reasonable time — "Seasonably," 
(1) Whenever this act requires any action to be taken within a reason-
able time, any time which is not manifestly unreasonable may be 
fixed by agreement. 
(2) What is a reasonable time for taking any action depends on the 
nature, purpose and circumstances of such action. 
(3) An action is taken "seasonably" when it is taken at or within the 
time agreed or if no time is agreed at or within a reasonable time. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 1-204. should be ruled upon as a matter of law. Lish 
^ v. Compton (1976) 547 P 2d 223. 
Questions of fact and law. 
What constitutes a reasonable time is usu- Collateral References. 
ally a question of fact, but if the time elapsed Time <3= 15. 
was outside the ambit which fair-minded 86 CJS Time § 8. 
persons might conclude was reasonable, it 15A AmJur 2d 480, Commercial Code § 27. 
70A-1-205. Course of dealing and usage of trade. 
(1) A course of dealing is a sequence of previous conduct between the 
parties to a particular transaction which is fairly to be regarded 
as establishing a common basis of understanding for interpreting 
their expressions and other conduct. 
(2) A usage of trade is any practice or method of dealing having such 
regularity of observance in a place, vocation or trade as to justify 
an expectation that it will be observed with respect to the trans-
action in question. The existence and scope of such a usage are to 
be proved as facts. If it is established that such a usage is embodied 
in a written trade code or similar writing the interpretation of the 
writing is for the court. 
(3) A course of dealing between parties and any usage of trade in the 
vocation or trade in which they are engaged or of which they are 
or should be aware give particular meaning to and supplement or 
qualify terms of an agreement. 
(4) The express terms of an agreement and an applicable course of 
dealing or usage of trade shall be construed wherever reasonable 
as consistent with each other; but when such construction is unrea-
sonable express terms control both course of dealing and usage of 
trade and course of dealing controls usage of trade. 
(5) An applicable usage of trade in the place where any part of perfor-
mance is to occur shall be used in interpreting the agreement as 
to that part of the performance. 
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STATE OF T3TAH ) 
XUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) —-
, Donald Thompson_being duly sworn deposes s^ id states ^ hat he made the foregoing 
statement and that the same is true to the best of his knowledge, information and belief. 
Notarjr Public: ^ % ^ * f f L - — v ^ ^ L —
 B^J^> v-jc-f/, Residing in Salt Lake, Ut 
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E. H. FANKHAUSER 
Bar No, 1032 
Attorney for Defendant 
243 East 400 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 534-1148 
THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
* 
K & K INSURANCE AGENCY, 
* AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
Plaintiff, MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND 
* JUDGMENT OR VACATE JUDGMENT 
vs. 
* Civil No. 883003265 CV 
SALT LAKE TYPEWRITER, INC. * Judge Eleanor Van Sciver 
a Utah Corporation, 
* 
Defendant. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss • 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
ODELL SANDERS, being first sworn on oath deposes and states 
that he is the President of Defendant, Salt Lake Typewriter, 
Inc., and has personal knowledge of the matters stated herein. 
1. Affiant, together with L. Keith Day and Margaret Voyles 
went to the business office of K & K Insurance Agency on or about 
October , 1988, for the purpose of viewing the typewriter 
which is the subject of this action. 
2. Upon entering the business office of K & K Insurance 
Agency, Affiant observed the Hermes 51 typewriter, which is the 
subject of this action, to be on a desk, in operating condition 
and in use. Mary B. Strand was the person who was using the 
typewriter. 
3. Upon observing the typewriter in use, I inquired of Mary 
B. Strand concerning the machine and her use of it. She then 
related to me that the typewriter had been in use continuously 
since K & K Insurance Agency moved its office from 654 South 9th 
East, Salt Lake City, Utah to 4991 South 700 East, Suite 520, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, I inquired about the claims that the 
machine would not operate properly and was defective. She 
related to me that Associated Business Machines had found a loose 
wire and had fixed it. I requested she produce the repair bill 
or invoice showing repair of the machine. She could not produce 
a repair order or invoice and then stated that she thought that 
there had been no charge for the repair of the loose wire. 
4. She stated in my presence and the presence of L. Keith 
Day and Margaret Voyles that the machine had operated properly 
since K & K Insurance Agency had moved its offices to 4001 South 
700 East, Suite 520, Salt Lake City, Utah and the alleged repair 
of the loose wire by Associated Business Machines. 
5. All of this information was well known to the Plaintiff 
at the time of the hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment. 
That the Plaintiff willfully failed to disclose this information 
to the Court. Plaintiff represented to the Court that the 
typewriter had sat idle for months and was out of service. 
Plaintiff also claimed to hold a security interest in the subject 
typewriter until recovery of the purchase price sought in this 
action by its Motion for Summary Judgment. Under these 
circumstances, the typewriter was not accessible to Affiant for 
the purpose of determining that the typewriter was not in fact 
idle, was in use and had been in use continuously by the 
Plaintiff from the time of filing the Motion for Summary Judgment 
to and including the date of hearing before this Court. 
6. I reaffirm my former Affidavit on file in this case to 
the effect that the problem with the machine was the improper 
power source used by Plaintiff at its prior business office, 654 
South 9th East, Salt Lake City, Utah as opposed to the power 
source now being used by Plaintiff at its present office 
location, 4001 South 700 East, Suite 520, Salt Lake City, Utah 
and not due to any defect in the machine itself. 
A &UA\ /< s\/Girls!«t^&As<-
ODfiLL SANDERS 
L sV(?<syi*<XAfA 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this ffli* daY of 
November, 1988. 
A***f{^ J. )TJ\RY PUBLIC * NOT 
R e s i d i n g in S a l t Lake Coun ty , Utah 
My Commission E x p i r e s : 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I c e r t i f y a t r u e and c o r r e c t c o p y of t h e f o r e g o i n g was 
m a i l e d t o J o h n B. A n d e r s o n , A t t o r n e y f o r P l a i n t i f f , 623 E a s t 
F i r s t S o u t h , S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84102 on t h i s -^L day of 
November, 1 9 8 8 . 
E. H. FANKHAUSER 
Bar No. 1032 
Attorney for Defendant 
243 East 400 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 534-114 8 
THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
K & K INSURANCE AGENCY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
* AFFIDAVIT OF L. KEITH DAY 
* Civil No. 883003265 CV 
* Judge Eleanor Van Sciver 
SALT LAKE TYPEWRITER, INC., 
a Utah Corporation, * 
Defendant. * 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss . 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
L. KEITH DAY, being first sworn on oath deposes and states 
that he has personal knowledge of the matters set forth 
hereinbelow. 
1. On or about October ^c^7
 r 1988, I accompanied Odell 
Sanders and Margaret Voyles to the business office of K & K 
Insurance Agency, 4001 South 700 East, Suite 520, Salt Lake City, 
Utah. 
2. On arrival at the business office of K & K Insurance 
Agency I observed the Hermes 51 typewriter to be on a desk, in 
use and operated by Mary B. Strand. 
3. I was present and heard all of the conversation between 
Odell Sanders and Ms* Strand pertaining to the operation and 
continued use of the typewriter. Ms. Strand admitted that the 
typewriter had been used continuously by K & K Insurance Agency 
contrary to their representations that it had set idle for 
several months. I heard her tell Mr. Sanders that Associated 
Business Machines had found a loose wire and repaired it. I was 
present when she indicated she could not produce a repair order 
or invoice from Associated Business Machines. She stated to Mr. 
Sanders that the machine had been in use and operated properly 
since K & K Insurance Agency moved its office to 4001 South 700 
East, Suite 520, Salt Lake City, Utah^and was operating properly 
on this occasion. 
r. KEITH DAY 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this Z^fS day of 
November, 1988. 
h *>„ . „ — , 
I0TARY PUBLIC ' 
My 
CDr>rri3S!on 
NOT 
Residing in Salt Lake County, Utah 
My Commission Expires: 
-2-
E. H. FANKHAUSER 
Bar No. 1032 
Attorney for Defendant 
243 East 400 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 534-1148 
THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
K & K INSURANCE AGENCY, 
* AFFIDAVIT OF MARGARET VOYLES 
Plaintiff, 
* Civil No. 883003265 CV 
vs. 
* Judge Eleanor Van Sciver 
SALT LAKE TYPEWRITER, INC., 
a Utah Corporation, * 
Defendant. * 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
MARGARET VOYLES, being first sworn on oath deposes and 
states that she has personal knowledge of the matters set forth 
hereinbelow. 
1. On or about October <£$*}: , 1988, I accompanied Odell 
Sanders and L. Keith Day to the business office of K & K 
Insurance Agency, 4001 South 700 East, Suite 520, Salt Lake City, 
Utah. 
2. On arrival at the business office of K & K Insurance 
Agency I observed the Hermes 51 typewriter to be on a desk, in 
use and operated by Mary B. Strand. 
3. I was present and heard all of the conversation between 
Odell Sanders and Ms. Strand pertaining to the operation and 
continued use of the typewriter. Ms. Strand admitted that the 
typewriter had been used continuously by K & K Insurance Agency 
contrary to their representations that it had set idle for 
several months. I heard her tell Mr. Sanders that Associated 
Business Machines had found a loose wire and repaired it. I was 
present when she indicated she could not produce a repair order 
or invoice from Associated Business Machines. She stated to Mr. 
Sanders that the machine had been in use and operated properly 
since K & K Insurance Agency moved its office to 4001 South 700 
East, Suite 520, Salt Lake City, Utah and was operating properly 
on this occasion. 
MARGARET ^ V O Y L E S ^ U 
Subscr ibed and sworn t o b e f o r e me t h i s 3*^ d ay of 
November, 1988 . 
JMf^NL V l^loUKxrl 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Res id ing in S a l t Lake County, Utah 
My Commission E x p i r e s : 
- 2 -
E. H. FANKHAUSER 
Bar N. 1032 
Attorney for Defendant 
243 East 400 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 534-1148 
THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
K & K INSURANCE AGENCY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE TYPEWRITER, INC., 
A Utah Corporation, 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF ODELL SANDERS 
IN OPPOSITION TO AFFIDAVIT 
OF ROBERT D. KAUFMAN 
Civil No. 883003265 CV 
Judge Van Sciver 
STATE OF UTAH 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
ODELL SANDERS, being sworn on oath deposes and states that 
he is the President of Defendant, Salt Lake Typewriter, Inc., a 
Utah Corporation, and has personal knowledge of the matters 
stated herein. In opposition to the Affidavit of Robert D. 
Kaufman, dated December 2, 1988, the following statements are 
submitted to the Court for its information and consideration. 
1. The Hermes 51 Typewriter was purchased by the 
Plaintiff, K & K Insurance Agency after the acceptable trial 
period had lapsed. The typewriter was delivered on March 30, 
1987. The actual sale was not completed until July 29, 1987. 
2. The old Hermes 51 typewriter referred to by Mr. Kaufman 
in his Affidavit was more of a typewriter and did not have the 
same circuitry or devices that the new 51 Hermes possessed. The 
new Hermes 51 typewriter had completely different CPU and 
circuitry, with added screen and disc drive. The machine would 
lose its memory when the power went off. Salt Lake Typewriter 
had no control over the power source or the stability of the 
power source that existed at K & Kfs offices located at 654 South 
900 East, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
3. Contrary to the statements of Mr. Kaufman, Salt Lake 
Typewriter never retook the machine after it was delivered. 
Further, K & K Insurance Agency did not keep the surge protector, 
and did not purchase it as claimed. K & K Insurance determined 
that the surge protector was too expensive and sent it back to 
Salt Lake Typewriter without using or paying for it. 
4. There never was a problem with the new Hermes 51 
typewriter other than the power problem at the old office 
location of K & K. Contrary to the statements of Robert D. 
Kaufman, in paragraph 3 of his Affidavit, no promises were made 
that the machine would be replaced or corrected. In fact, the 
machine was paid for 90 days after it was delivered and used by K 
& K Insurance. At the time payment was made, K & K Insurance was 
satisfied with the equipment and that it was working properly. 
5. Contrary to the statements of Mr. Kaufman, the only 
service call that was placed to Salt Lake Typewriter was related 
to the inadequate power source in the building occupied by K & K 
Insurance at 654 South 900 East, Salt Lake City, Utah. The 
statement by Mr. Kaufman that the surge protector did not cure 
the problem was due to the fact that it was not used by K & K. 
6. The statement by Mr. Kaufman that the old Hermes machine 
continued to operate without surge problem or protector on the 
same circuit was due to the fact that the machines were 
completely different. As stated, the old machine was more of a 
typewriter and did not have the same circuitry, capability, 
monitor, disc drive and added memory of the new computerized 
Hermes 51. Further, the old machine was on the opposite side of 
the room and connected to an entirely different outlet. 
7. The Court should be aware that the letter claimed to 
have been sent on February 5, 1988, was in fact sent by K & K 
Insurance to themselves and signed by their own employee, Mary 
Strang. Until the letter of February 29, 1988, Salt Lake 
Typewriter and myself were not aware until this point that there 
was a problem. Mr. Kaufman states that K & K moved its office in 
October, 1987. This gives rise to the question of why K & K 
waited five (5) months to notify Salt Lake Typewriter that it 
claimed a problem existed. 
8. From the time the letter of February 29, 1988 was 
received to the time the letter of March 23, 1988 attempting to 
revoke was sent and received, Salt Lake Typewriter was not given 
access to the equipment to determine if a problem existed, and if 
one did, what the nature of the problem was. 
9. Contrary to the statements made by Mr. Kaufman in 
paragraph 5 of his Affidavit, calls were made by Salt Lake 
Typewriter to K & K Insurance in an attempt to arrange an 
appointment to have the equipment inspected to determine if there 
was a problem, but was refused. 
10. The statements made by Mr. Kaufman in his Affidavit, 
paragraphs 6 and 7 are totally disputed. It was not until our 
surprise visit in October, 1988 that K & K claimed a repairman 
from Associated Business Equipment found a loose wire. We 
requested that they produce a copy of the repair order. As of 
this date, no service order or a copy of a repair order or 
statement has been produced by K & K to substantiate their 
claims. Further, Associated Business Equipment is basically a 
copier company. In that the Hermes 51 is a state of the art with 
modular plug in components, the only wires that could be found 
exposed would be to a light in the cover. Based on my personal 
inspection of the equipment in October, 1988, it is my opinion 
that the equipment worked properly and there never has been any 
repair to the machine as alleged. Further, the fact remains that 
there has never been any evidence produced that the equipment had 
an unknown defect other than the problems associated with the 
power interruption. The first notice of any alleged problem came 
five (5) months after K & K moved its offices on or about March 
1, 1988. I also wish to note that Mr. Kaufman does not deny that 
the new Hermes 51 typewriter, at the time of my surprise visit in 
October, 1988, was in fact in use and operating at the office of 
K & K Insurance by its employee, Mary B. Strand. 
r^A/j 4 
ODELL SANDERS 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this / 2 day °f 
December, 19&*•" ^ * J'/,^ / r\ 
ff-i ZL^~ -£- -i_ <-^u^ 
'."-V— »s NOTARY/PJJBLIC - >r 
• -.•-•!== 1. Residing in Salt Lake County, Utah 
My Commission Expires: <v/////.^.x^ 
DELIVERY CERTIFICATE 
I certify a true and correct copy of the foregoing was hand 
delivered to John B. Anderson, Attorney for Plaintiff, 623 East 
First South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 on this /2.&~ day of 
December, 1988. 
{ax^a-^t 
A N HUNT 
' AT LAW 
m 
« 
tTATe 
CITY, 
'..ayle Dean Hunt 
Attorney for Defendant 
2121 South State, 
Salt Lake C i — "• - 1 
tel 4868701 
,!! T"H'!\ '..'IRC'JIT '.iOUlV!.'
 p '.".ALT* T.AJCS C O M I T Y 
STA'IT, i,)]-' 1.1'Vi Ill 
K. AND K. INSURANCE AGENCY 
PLAINTIFF, 
VS 
SALT LAKE TYPEWRITER, INC., 
Defendant. • 
^i jnnc T , p Tnv 
M "" J ; K -
. eanoi ;>. vans 
i " I \ "'1 ,' I I I "" I I1"! I1 II 
I > 1. i l l * . L . I I i' | i I II, I | , l II 
County ol S a l t Laki 
U*IHI I I Iv swor? . .eposes and s a y s he 
" r e s i d e n t of Defendant company anc s f u ; . !v t r a i n e d e x p e r t ir: K],e 
i n s t a l l a t i o n , r e p a i r s v^* ^ ^ ^ " ^ " o of t h e Hermes e l e c t r o n I f |H-awr 
i r o r m e o t ^ n t h e r ewi t h he wr iJ L»j 
Mf summci,rv> a t t a c h e d n e r e t o r e s p e c t i n g c o n d i t i o n , c o m p l a i n t s , and a l l e g e d 
d e f e n c t s and *\a* * :.> - { ^ - ^ n * c "he reof a r e t r u e ctiid c o r r e c t . 
M^ 
Odell L. Sanders 
Subscribed and sworn to before me June 24^T9iJ8. 
My commission expires Jan. 1 
iry Public-risidien in Salt Lake 
County, >;tah 
SALT LAKEl I TYPEWRITER 
April 13, 1988 
RE: Civil #883003265CV 
Clerk 
Fifth Judicial Circuit Court 
Salt Lake County 
Salt Lake Department 
State of Utah 
To Whom It May Concern: 
The equipment purchased by K & K Insurance Agency was, in 
fact accepted on March 30, 1987 (see Exibit A) After a prior 
trial period and not July 29th as indicated. The equipment 
worked perfectly at the time of installation and also 4 months 
later when they paid for the equipment. 
The only service calls that were performed on this equipment 
were due to power failure at K & K Insurance, there was other 
equipment on the same circuit and overloading the breaker. Salt 
Lake Typewriter made several requests to have the equipment put 
on a isolated line or use a battery back up surge protector to 
prevent electrical damage to the equipment we also went as far as 
to install at our expense a battery back up line filter. This 
device would sound a alarm to allow the operator to reset the 
breaker after a power outage or power surge. The operator 
unplugged this device because the alarm annoyed her and plugged 
the equipment in direct, "proving the power problem at K & K 
Insurance did exist." 
The only other problem was cables unplugged at the 
equipment. 
* " - ' • " T V
 M T A H 8 4 1 1 1 / P H O N E (801 ) 3 6 4 - 8 6 0 0 
.AKEl I TYPEWRITER 
We have made every attempt to iectit> -in> problems inat nave 
come I i light, 1.11«-- problems that have existed at K H Insurance" 
have i een beyond nut control, because thev would not '©operate. 
Exibit (C) was never received, and signed ( nr I in unknown 
person, Exibit 101 was received March 1, I ill.. Due to the tact 
this equipment has1 l:u;jj , m service for over one year iUid IJ.-I I 
continually without proper power protection and has also bec-n 
relocated by Lhe customer Lu another location, Jithoul proper 
packing and installation - i.all Lake Typewriter cannot be 
responsible for tne condition of this equipment We can and will 
service this equipment *** required to brin,1 if i > pr"| > 
operating condition I i \M iui*y wawvuHe is '<M *'^M <""iich has 
ton^ since expired. 
We will be williiii, in ivui. i wi LU K \ H. Insurance to resolve 
this matter. However, diif* I i the l»*n • th of time involved, and I lie 
conditions in whi^h the equipment was subjected, the r nt of 
repair will h | K & Y Insurance, 
ff.W'J-i_ j/osy'-'b^ 
Odell L Sand«> 
President 
SALT LAKE TYPEWRITER 
777 South State 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
cc: Jv,. ~~" — 
. .- tor ... f 
st First f utn 
.o,i Lak? fit :ah 84102 
•i :, T A i r 
IAYI.E DEAN HUNT 
ATTORMSY AT LAW 
11 SI SOUTH STATE 
• ALT LAKK CITY. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On June 24, 1988 I mailed/delivered a copy of the foregoing Response 
to Motion for Summary Judgment to the following: 
John B. Anderson 
William A. Sornppi 
Anderson & Holland 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
623 East First South 
SLC, Utah 84102 
Telephone: 363-9345 
Attachments: 
1. Affidavit of Odell L. Sanders 
2. Affidavit of 
